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Dumping: Confronting the
Paradox of Internal Weakness

and External Challenge
BART S. FISHER

Large-scale, continuous dumping is essentially the
transmission of an economic adjustment problem from one country
to another. When dumping reaches acute proportions it may create
foreign policy problems involving the maintenance of good relations
among nation-states as well as economic adjustment problems for
the importing country.
Unfortunately, dumping today poses serious foreign policy problems for the United States, particularly with respect to many other
advanced industrial states. Dumping is but one of a series of major
economic issues faced by the United States today in the international
arena, however, and its importance should not be emotionalized or
overstated.
The salience of dumping as an issue is, in fact, merely a reflection
of the basic transformation which is currently taking place in the
international system. We are moving out of an era dominated by
military issues into an era in which war in the form of direct confrontations between major states may virtually disappear.' This is due to
many reasons, not the least of which is the awesome 2increase in the
ability to inflict irreparable harm on the human race.
As the use of force declines as an instrument of developed country
policies, the use of economic methods of competition as instruments
of national policy can be expected to increase. 3 It is irrelevant
whether power in this context is perceived as a zero-sum concept,
flowing from the "security" to the "economic" realm. Perhaps, as
Tucker has argued, all power is at a discount, with economic issues
merely appearing to grow in salience. 4 The fact remains that we
are entering a new international environment in which conflicts
Bart S. Fisher is a member of the District of Columbia Bar; a partner in the
law firm of Patton, Boggs and Blow, Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor of international relations at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
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between nations will typically involve the allocation of economic resources, rather than the traditional type of conflicts over ideological
or military objectives.
Dumping today involves considerable amounts of economic redumping is a matter of
sources. Thus, the proper response to foreign
5
"high" foreign policy for the United States.
The principal paradox posed by the recent increase in dumping by
many advanced industrial states is that it is simultaneously a reflection of internal weakness by the dumping country and external challenge to the importing country. As a general rule, countries attempt
to confront other countries with challenges from a position of
6
strength in important foreign policy matters. Many countries have
recently engaged in large-scale continuous dumping into the United
States market, however, because they are weakened economically by
recessionary forces, increased oil prices, and chronic overcapacity in
key sectors. Equally important, they are enfeebled politically by fragile governments unable to cope with powerful domestic groups seeking a larger share of the national product. These governments may
not only condone dumping, but support it through subsidies or other
market-related schemes in order to achieve national objectives. Increasingly, the distinction between subsidies and dumping is becoming more blurred, and the solutions to both problems should be approached in a coordinated manner.
In yet another paradox, the weakness-indeed, the desperation-of7
certain trading partners has become a key element in their strength.
The chronic weakness of dumping states may become an insurance
policy against -vigorous enforcement of the United States antidumping laws, especially by those in the United States government who
have become fearful of growing Eurocommunism. Continuous dumping may conceivably evolve into a permissible concealed form of devaluation used to subsidize excess employment, underwrite oil costs,
and carry unneeded capacity.
While most large-scale dumping today appears to be the result of
weakness, it presents an external challenge to the economic system
of the importing country by creating dislocations in employment and
capital investments and lessened profitability for business enterprises. 8 It also creates political tensions between the dumping country and the importing country. On the benefit side of the equation,
dumping presents lower prices to consumers, results in more competition and improved industrial performance, and acts as an antiinflationary mechanism of price control.
The United States must make a delicate calculus, taking into account the benefits of dumping, as well as its costs. The analysis is
complicated, and does not lend itself to simplistic solutions that are
either "free trade" or "protectionist" in nature. Like trade itself,
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dumping has become increasingly politicized. The solutions must
therefore be balanced ones, taking into account political as well as
economic and legal factors.
Before solutions can be proferred, three questions need to be
answered:
1. what is dumping;
2. has dumping increased; and
3. assuming so, why is increased dumping taking place.
After considering these three questions seriatim, this article concludes that vigorous enforcement of the United States antidumping
laws is in the best interests of the United States and an open world
trading system. This policy is not antithetical to a free trade policy
for the United States; rather, it is the essential precondition for a
continuation of the liberal trade policy pursued by the United States
since the commencement of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934.

THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF DUMPING

Apart from the legal definitions of dumping, 9 the practice by economists has traditionally been to subdivide dumping into three temporal categories: sporadic, intermittent, and continuous or persistent.
Sporadic dumping typically involves the occasional sale of overstock
at low prices in "fire sale" fashion. As such, it poses little concern to
the importing country. Intermittent dumping, on the other hand, is of
greater concern to the importing country, as the dumper in this case
tries to establish a foothold by selling for brief periods at prices less
than fair value. After the foreign competitor is eliminated, the
dumper may then raise his prices to the detriment of consumers.
There appears to be a consensus that this form of predatory dumping
is an unfair foreign trade practice that should be moved against. 10
Whether large-scale continuous dumping poses problems or benefits for the importing country is a subject of intense controversy."
Continuous dumping over an extended period of time may exist for a
variety of economic reasons, including a desire to obtain economies
of scale from fixed assets or to shore up a nation's balance of trade
posture. It may also reflect a political decision to continue an essentially unprofitable enterprise and maintain a given level of employment. Recent cases of large-scale continuous dumping appear to
have involved the steel (1976, 1977),12 electronics (1971, 1972),13
automobile (1974, 1975),14 and sugar (1977, 1978) 15 industries. It is
important to distinguish the major market incursions that have

14 oAntidumping Law
occurred in these areas from the sporadic or predatory dumping practice of a particular enterprise. The latter simply involves a particularized adversary proceeding between private parties; the former are
national controversies involving either public enterprises or enterprises pursuing national objectives in a parallel manner.
The public policy question raised by large-scale continuous dumping is the focus of this article; the legal and economic issues raised
by all three types of dumping have been addressed by the author in
an earlier article. 16
In general, a continuous dumping scheme cannot long endure
without governmental assistance in the form of subsidies or barriers
to reentry of the dumped or similar goods. 17 These forms of governmental assistance are generally the condition precedent to a successful continuous dumping scheme; they act as handmaidens to the
secure position of the exporting firm in the home market country.
Continuous dumping, under any definition, must be distinguished
from import-penetration situations involving fairly priced goods or
goods competing on their merits without artificial assistance. For
example, section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to deal
with imports of goods causing serious injury to domestic industry;
the price of imported goods is relevant, but not dispositive in this
form of proceeding. Since fair competition is generally involved, the
injury standard' and administrative procedures'19 make it very difficult to obtain import-limiting actions from the Executive branch. 20 In
contrast, once dumping has been established, antidumping duties
may be obtained if anything more than de minimis injury is established. 2 ' Whether or not economists and lawyers agree, Congress and
the International Trade Commission will require a lower standard of
injury when dumping is involved in the import transaction.

HAS DUMPING INCREASED?

Like the definition of dumping, the magnitude of dumping into the
United States marketplace is a perplexing question. The amount of
dumping can be measured in terms of cases actually processed at the
Treasury Department, affirmative dumping injury decisions rendered by the International Trade Commission (hereinafter ITC), or
on a qualitative basis. Each barometer of dumping has major flaws.
Treasury Department Proceedings
If 'one were to gauge the amount of dumping (in terms of Treasury
Department proceedings), table 1 shows that dumping has increased
dramatically since 1969, when only six cases were processed. The
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Table 1.
Cases Processedby the Treasury Department,1969-78
Fiscal Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978 (through August, 1978)

Number Processed
6
17
34
32
21
11
23
13
29
28

Source: U.S. Customs Service, Department of the
Treasury.

absolute numbers do not indicate the volume of trade involved, the
number of potentially valid petitions that were either never filed or
never accepted due to lack of information, or the greater difficulty in
obtaining acceptance of petitions after 1974. On the other hand, it
seems safe to say that the increase in cases processed by Treasury
reflects the increased dumping that has occurred since 1969.
InternationalTrade Commission Proceedings
A finding of dumping follows a bifurcated proceeding. After Treasury
establishes sales at less than fair value the petitioner must also prove
to the ITC that injury to an American industry has occurred or is
likely to occur as a result of the foreign dumping. The International
Trade Commission record of affirmative injury decisions has varied
greatly. These ITC findings (which follow in table 2) do not reflect
cases of dumping where no injury has been found, or discontinued
cases, such as the case of automobile dumping in 1975. Therefore,
they do not adequately measure the magnitude of dumping over the
last eight years.
A QualitativeAnalysis
A qualitative analysis of steel and consumer electronics, two key
sectors of the United States economy, demonstrates the increase in
continuous dumping. Apart from the magnitude of dumping involved, these sectors have been selected to illustrate differing reactions to the phenomenon of price discrimination.
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Table 2.
Affirmative ITC Findings
Year

Number

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978 (through August, 1978)

4
13
15
12
4
2
4
7
3

Source: International Trade Commission.

Steel
The most startling increase in dumping in recent years has occurred
in the steel sector. "Big Steel" has been pilloried in the press and
by academic commentators 22 since 1962, when President Kennedy
forced a rollback in the announced price increases of the industry, 23
and the industry's grasp of public relations has been less than magnificent. Nevertheless, the claim of the industry that it has been victimized by foreign dumping since 1976 appears to be valid.
On a price basis, Japanese price discrimination between domestic
shipments and exports to the United States appeared to be on the
order of $25 per net ton in 1976.24 On a cost basis, Japanese producers appeared to sell at an estimated average of $32 per ton below
average cost in 1976 and an estimated $46 below average cost for the
first nine months of 1977, behavior that would also qualify as dumping under the second legal definition of dumping discussed above. 25
Given the bad press Japanese economic policy has received in recent years, the allegation of steel dumping from Japan might merit
little more than a yawn. The truly astonishing aspect of the steel
dumping story in 1977 was the performance in the United States
marketplace of steel exporters from the European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC). In 1977, while the exports of steel from Japanese producers actually declined somewhat in volume, imports into
the United States from European producers more than doubled from
3.2 million to 6.8 million tons (table 3). The EEC found it difficult in
1976 and 1977 to organize its steel market due to the problem of
domestic discounting among the nine members of the Community.
To remedy this tendency towards discounting and protect the domestic market, the EEC instituted two plans in 1976 and 1977, known as
the Simonet2 6 and Davignon plans. Viscount Etienne Davignon, who
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Table 3.
Imports of Steel Mill Products
Thousands of Net Tons
Imports from
Japan
EEC
All other

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

5,637
6,510
3,003

6,159
6,424
3,387

5,844
4,123
2,046

7,984
3,188
3,113

7,820
6,828
4,659

Total imports
15,150
Apparent consumption
122,528
Imports as percentage of
apparent consumption 12.4%

15,970
119,609

12,012
89,016

14,284
101,078

19,307
108,451

13.4%

13.5%

14.1%

17.8%

Source: Statistics from the American Iron and Steel Institute.

established his early credentials with the establishment of the International Energy Agency (hereinafter IEA) in 1975, turned his attention to steel in 1977 with devastating results. 2 7 The Davignon Plan
for steel consists of three separate but interrelated elements:
(a) guidance prices on intra-EEC transactions 28 (to be supplemented by required minimum prices);
(b) production quotas; and
(c) minimum base prices for imports.
The extent of dumping by the EEC in 1977 can be gleaned from a
comparison of the internal base guidance price and the average price
of exports to the United States for the major steel product categories.
Significantly, in all categories except one (steel bars), substantial
price differences are revealed (table 4).
Apart from disregarding the traditional price measurement of
dumping, 29 the EEC has also engaged in significant below-cost pricing 3" to the United States. Its below-cost sales performance appears
to be even more pervasive than Japan's, as it is a less efficient producer of steel than Japan, and is therefore required to sell at lower
price levels relative to the actual cost of production than Japan. 31
Evidence indicates that realized revenues on European shipments to
the United States averaged $50 per net ton below cost and profit
during the first nine months of 1977 (table 5).
If the steel industry is to be believed-and the burden of disproving
this rests with those contesting the allegation-the loss in revenue
due to lost sales caused to the domestic steel industry by dumping in
1976 and 1977 amounted to over $1.05 billion (table 6).32
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Table 4.
Price Discriminationby Steel Producersin the EEC, October through
December 1977 (in dollars per net ton)
(b)
(a)
Internal Base
Guidance Prices
(excluding extras)

Product
Category

Cold rolled
sheets and
strip
Hot rolled
sheets and
strip
Plates
Bars
Structurals
Wire rods

Average Price of
Exports to the U.S.,
F.O.B. Port of
Exportation
(including extras)

(c)
Differences

$318

$240

$78

239
230
250
250
260

193
203
291
219
193

46
27
-41
31
67

Source: Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett Study.

Table 5.
Below-Cost Pricing of Exports to the U.S. by the EEC Steel Industry:
StandardMix of Carbon Steel Products (in dollars per ton)
(a)
(b)
Average Cost
Average Realized
(c)
Year
Including Profit
Revenue
Difference
1976

$307

1977

341

$257
268*

*Only nine months available for 1977.

Table 6.
Injury to the Domestic Steel Industry Causedby
Dumping in 1976 and 1977 ($ millions, before taxes)
Quantity
Price
Total
Year
Impact
Impact
Injury
1976
1977
Total

$

124
933

$ 547
2,411

$ 671
3,344

$1,057

$2,958

$4,015

Source: Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett Study.

(b)-(a)
-$50
-

73
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Impact of Dumping
Steel is the classic case of a non-footloose industry.33 Continuous
dumping of steel may thus result in serious discontinuities, due to
the immobility of its labor force and the idling of its capital stock,
which cannot be easily moved to another sector or another country.
There are also significant short term inelasticities of supply, as new
steelmaking capacity requires from two to seven years to install. The
steel industry has responded to foreign dumping by idling some of its
its capital stock overseas
domestic facilities. It has not transferred
34
for shipment into the United States.
Dumping may have more pernicious consequences for the owners
of the means of production of non-footloose industries such as steel,
with relatively high entry barriers. The adjustment costs for labor,
however, should not differ significantly. If dumping results in retiring an excessive amount of United States steel capacity, United
States producers may be unable to meet future supply scarcities due
to the difficult market entry conditions of the industry. This, of
course, is hard to assess, and opinions with respect to the steel
situation differ dramatically. 35 The owners of the means of production of products manufactured under a stable technology, with low
entry requirements, are better able to adjust to dumping, and indeed, take advantage of it, than are products produced by nonfootloose industries.

WHY HAS DUMPING INCREASED?

Dumping has increased for structural reasons. These include slow
growth and unemployment in the OECD area, increased oil prices,
and overcapacity. Increased dumping is also a result of conscious
decisions to expand market shares.
Slow Growth and Unemployment in the OECD Area
The dominant pattern of activity in the OECD area is that of slow
growth in output and trade, and a continued rate of high unemployment. GNP growth for 1978 seems likely to stay around 3.5 percent,
about the same as 1977. Unemployment will remain around the level
of 5.3 percent for the OECD area, and the OECD predicts that recorded unemployment in OECD area countries could increase by
more than half a million persons in early 1979.36 The rise in unemployment seems likely to be widespread in continental Europe despite large-scale European efforts to support employment through
subsidies and other measures. 37 Moreover, a general slowdown in
productivity growth 3s has added to recessionary pressures.
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The stagnation of the OECD economies has a direct bearing on the
problem of dumping. Countries mired in a recession, with high unemployment rates, are very reluctant to add to their pool of unemployed.
Instead, labor will be treated as a fixed cost, much like capital equipment, and workers will continue to produce items at artificially low
subsidized prices, with real unemployment being disguised. Products
may then be sold at price-discriminating levels at whatever price the
markets will bear. This may become a continuous dumping policy
under any definition, with goods being sold at even less than marginal
costs.
A cursory analysis indicates the strength of organized labor in the
OECD area, and its pervasive fixed-cost characteristic. In Italy the
organized labor force serving large enterprises has contracts that
make the dismissal of employees extremely difficult. 39 In France the
Government backed off from a scheme to rationalize the steel industry by reducing employment, and ended up controlling two-thirds of
the leading steel groups in France in September, 1978.40 A similar
reaction occurred recently in Belgium, 4 ' and in the United Kingdom
the British Steel Corporation continues to operate at relatively full
employment rates despite its fantastic financial losses in recent
years. 42 Nevertheless, there are serious strains now on the social
contract in the United Kingdom, and British workers may be exbeing made to reduce employpected to resist the proposals currently
43
ment in the industry by 40,000 jobs.
The growth in power of trade unions in Europe is a classic example
of the politics of pluralistic stagnation. 44 In this type of development,
interest groups come to play a progressively greater role in the processes of government and policymaking. This leads to immobilisme
as governments become blocked from pursuing "national interest"
policies by strong and broadly based interest groups. Unions in Britain, France, and Italy have been elevated-or have elevated themselves-into veto groups capable45 of frustrating what would otherwise be rational economic policy.
In contrast, the growth of contract labor in Japan gives the Japanese added flexibility in laying off workers. Thus, the traditional
view of labor as a fixed cost in Japan leading to dumping4 6 may
bear serious revision. Japan has closed down eighteen of her fiftyeight blast furnaces since 1974. In addition, Japan's multiproduct
companies, such as Sumitomo, are shifting many workers out of
steel into other lines of production, such as automobiles. On an
overall basis, however, in Japan as in Europe, governments are
loath to take the political heat for adding to the unemployment rolls.
Continued production-and continued dumping-is a more politically palatable alternative.
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INCREASED OIL PRICES

The second reason why dumping has increased recently relates to
the serious balance of trade deficits run by several key OECD countries since the OPEC oil price increases of 1973. In 1974 alone, the
additional cost of oil imports was $50 billion for the OECD countries. 47 The additional balance of trade deficit of the oil-importing
countries has translated into trade surpluses for the OPEC countries. Based on the 1972 OECD and OPEC trade balances, it is at
least arguable that a $250 billion dollar resource transfer has been
made to OPEC exporters by the OECD above "normal" 1972
48
prices.
To reduce these mind-boggling figures to the level of individual
countries in the OECD area might be useful. For Italy, two-thirds of
its trade deficit in the first half of 1974 was due solely to the purchase of petroleum products. 49 The oil crisis has also been a severe
blow to Japan. Japan relies on oil for 70 percent of its energy needs,
and at the time the "oil shock" came, Japan imported 99 percent of
its petroleum. 50
Increased oil costs intensify recessionary pressure, which has already been cited as one key reason for dumping. Higher oil costs also
increase dumping in another respect: they augment neomercantilist
pressures on non-oil sectors of the exporting economy. Simply put,
as imports dramatically increase in cost, strong incentives are
created to promote exports in order to reduce the balance of trade
deficit.
To put the argument succinctly, it would seem that several key
OECD nations have been dumping steel and other products into the
United States in order to permit them to afford more expensive en5
ergy imports. '

Overcapacity
52

The third major reason for increased dumping is overcapacity.
Overcapacity leads to dumping, as firms will reason that they should
sell at whatever price the market will bear in order to attempt to
cover their fixed costs. There appears to be substantial overcapacity
at present in the steel53 and automotiveM industries. Significant additional capacity is coming onstream in the petrochemical sector, 55 a
problem that will increase as the OPEC oil-producing countries develop their own processing facilities in the next decade. 56 This may
indicate that the next major wave of dumping cases will be in the
57
area of petrochemicals.
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CONSCIOUS MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES

Finally, dumping has increased as a result of conscious market entry
strategies. The classic case of taking over a market involved the
dumping of TV sets. Promotion of a new product must be carefully
distinguished from the predatory dumping situation. 58 The latter
clearly requires swift, affirmative corrective actions under the antidumping law or another statute.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN DUMPING:
THE ENIGMATIC ROLE OF THE STATE

With the exception of market entry, the goals discussed above-lower
unemployment, reduced balance of trade deficits, and use of overcapacity-are national objectives superimposed on the objectives of
individual enterprises. While an individual firm may be willing to lay
off workers and idle capacity, the government may not be willing to
do so for political reasons. Conversely, the government may desire to
rationalize an inefficient sector of the economy but be unable to
stand up to powerful trade unions wishing to avoid economic dislocations. In each case the result is the same: labor becomes a fixed cost
that needs to be covered by the domestic enterprise. It is the thesis of
this article that dumping policies are increasingly state-led or statesupported efforts to improve national economic postures.
In 1900 Brooks Adams said that nation-states were behaving more
and more like huge corporations in competition. 59 Today nationstates frequently are huge corporations in competition. This is especially true in such dumping-prone sectors as steel. For example, governments owned raw steel products enterprises in twenty-one major
countries in 1975.60 Government-owned exports to the United States
from these twenty-one countries accounted for 11.1 percent of total
United States steel imports in 1974.61
In Japan, the state has played a crucial role in the generation and
implementation of foreign economic policy. 62 As early as 1950 the
government in Japan emphasized the development of the steel industry. Furthermore, the government facilitates the steel industry development by acting, in effect, as a well-controlled revolving door providing entrance to and exit from Japan.6
In Italy, state-controlled enterprises have become as significant in
domestic and international economic affairs as the large private corporations. 64 The Institute for the Reconstruction of Italy (hereinafter
IRI), the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, and other state-owned enterprises are responsible to the Ministry for State Holdings, and the
Foreign Ministry.6 5 Finsider, the steel state-participation enterprise

Dumping • 23

run by IRI, has, like its British counterpart,
British Steel Corpora66
tion, lost enormous sums in recent years.
The list could continue, but, hopefully, the point has been made.
United States industries which are particularly vulnerable to dumping, such as the steel industry, are private firms in which shareholders hold management responsible for making a profit, and these
private firms are increasingly competing in a world of profitless enterprises with markets insulated by governmental tariff and nontariff
barriers to trade. Dumping has thus become transmogrified from the
classical profit-maximizing action of a private firm to a concealed
partial devaluation of the currency of the exporting country carried
out by the national government for national objectives.67 Instead of
its traditional role as a micro-economic industry problem, dumping is
increasingly a reflection of the macroeconomic problems of central
government authorities.
Without the ability to implement the decision to dump for the reasons enumerated earlier, the objectives of national policy would
remain objectives, and not national policies implemented by the
government.

WHAT IS

THE APPROPRIATE UNITED STATES

RESPONSE TO DUMPING?

The United States should vigorously enforce the current antidumping law. Dumping misallocates world resources,6 8 and enforcement
of the antidumping law sends a message to the dumping country that
the United States will not let that country profit from trade barriers
imposed to maintain its dumping scheme.6 9 In addition, enforcement
of antidumping law rallies support for the cause of free trade. 70 Thus,
both the objectives of an open world economy and a liberal trade
policy for the United States are preserved by vigorously enforcing the
dumping law.
How vigorously the United States enforces the antidumping laws is
ultimately a political question. Other nations have dumped their economic adjustment problems at the American doorstep and said, "You
adjust," treating the United States as if it were the world's residual
buyer of the imported product.
The American response to continuous dumping in the steel area
has been the reference price plan, or Trigger Price Mechanism (hereinafter TPM). Essentially, this is a procedure that permits the Treasury Department to institute a dumping investigation on its own initiative when import prices are below listed prices for certain steel
mill products. 71 The trigger prices are based on Japanese production
costs, which are the world's lowest.
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The reference plan is exceedingly complex and controversial, and
the jury is still out on its effectiveness. Nevertheless, some preliminary generalizations may be useful.
1. As a political device to buy time until the domestic steel industry
began to recover from its depressed condition in 1977, the TPM
was a master stroke. With unemployment reaching politically unacceptable levels in the steel industry in 1977, something had to
be done. A price solution, rather than a quantitative restraint solution, was not overly disruptive of political relationships with
United States trading partners. Indeed, spokesmen from the Japanese steel industry have commended the TPM for introducing a
measure of discipline into the pricing of steel in the United States
72
marketplace.
2. As an economic device to prop up a depressed steel industry the
TPM has worked well. Steel company profits have been fairly
permitted the
strong since the introduction of the TPM, which has
73
industry to raise its prices by 12 percent in 1978.
3. As an import-limiting device, if that was its intent, the TPM has
failed miserably. Steel imports actually jumped 18.6 percent for
the first nine months of 1978, and should exceed the 1977 record
of 19.3 million tons. 74 Imports have dropped substantially from
Japan, but have increased sharply from the EEC, and other countries as shown in table 7. For the first time imports from other
countries will exceed the totals from the EEC and from Japan, as
the two traditional big suppliers are left contending for second
place.
4. The TPM continues the evolution of United States dumping enforcement away from price and toward the cost of production as
the referent for fair value. Enforcing the TPM has been difficult,
since production costs are obviously different for each country.
The single-tier pricing mechanism of the TPM keyed to Japanese
costs has given the EEC a "license to dump," a license to sell in
the United States at a price above the trigger price, yet below the
domestic price or cost of production. 75 The single-tier pricing
mechanism apparently reflected the political decision to move
against dumping from Japan but to risk large-scale dumping
from "our European friends. ' 76 The Japanese trade surplus had
become embarrassingly large in 1977, and politically unpopular
in the United States, so it was deemed politic to move against
Japan.
Whether a multi-tier TPM is to be adopted to reflect European costs
will also be a political decision. Inflationary concerns place the Administration on the horns of a dilemma in this respect: a multi-tier
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Table 7.
Steel Imports
Supplier

9 months, 1978

9 months, 1977

Percent
Change

EEC
Japan
Canada
All
Other

5,529,666
5,065,195
-

4,373,828
5,954,167
1,430,828

+26
-15
-

Total

16,030,958

-

1,761,674

-

13,520,497

+19

Source: Steel Week, October 30, 1978.

TPM would clearly be more inflationary than a single-tier TPM,
while continuation of the single-tier TPM risks additional unemployment in the steel industry, and deepening a possible recession in
1979.
The American reaction to steel dumping in 1977 and 1978 and the
decision of Treasury to discontinue the automobile dumping case in
1975 constitute admission that the current dumping laws may be
inadequate to handle large-scale continuous dumping. As the science
of economics becomes more exact it may be possible to develop more
accurate cost of production models for industry sectors. Such models
would permit the United States government to set up an "early warning" system for foreign suppliers and thus ease enforcement problems under the Antidumping Act of 1921. At the present, however, a
cost-oriented antidumping enforcement approach would have all the
disadvantages of posted prices, could tend to be inflationary if not
properly calculated, and would be inordinately complex. Notwithstanding these negative effects, a cost-oriented antidumping enforcement approach seems preferable to the alternative technique of individual antidumping petitions in large-scale continuous dumping
cases based on price discrimination theory.
In any case, the antidumping law should not be repealed, as some
in this volume suggest. It must be improved and enforced. Inaccu7
rate antitrust analogies for determining injury from dumping "
should not be relied on. Instead, trade should be treated as a special
Federal responsibility, as the Constitution suggests. 7 8 It does matter
to United States workers who puts them out of work, and whose
economic adjustment problem they are bearing. It does matter why
prices of goods are cheaper. To ignore these facts is to be excessively
theoretical and ideological, and therefore of limited utility to the
practical policymaker.
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NOTES

1. Hunter, Power and Peace, 9
FOREIGN POL'Y 37, 38 (1972).

2. Id.
3. On this point, see Bergsten,
Keohane, & Nye, International
Economics and International
Politics:A Frameworkfor
Analysis, in WORLD POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL Eco-

NOMICS (C. Bergsten and L.

Krause, eds. 1975).
4. R. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF
NATIONS (1977).

5. "High" foreign policy has traditionally been linked with national security affairs. "Low"
foreign policy has been used to
describe functional, economically-related issues that may
actually consume more manhours in the bureaucratic operation of a government but receive less attention from the
highest government officials.
On the evolution of trade policy matters from "low" to
"high" foreign policy, see
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